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23 SEP 1955

Chief, EE INFO: Chief, PBCABOOSE
Chief, SR
Chief of Station, Germany


Operational/PBCABOOSE/REDWOOD/SGLUMMOX/AECOB

Operations Report of Overflight

REFERENCE: FR 50-710

The following paragraphs are numbered to correspond with those in attachment 2, Operations Report, to Field Regulation 50-710, Air Operations, Approval and Clearance of Overflights, dated 27 September 1954.

1. AECOB.
2. 10-11 September 1955.
3. L-20 (BEAVER) No. 16260
4. Pilot - []
Navigator - []
5. Airlanded resupply/exfiltration two (2) agents (CAMBAROT and GABUSO 2).
6. Aircraft did not land. Ninety (90) pounds of agent supplies scheduled for airlanded delivery were returned to base.
7. None.



8. A four (4) man reception committee, including the two (2) agents to be exfiltrated, was scheduled to outline the LZ with the standard "L" light pattern and to identify the LZ by blinking the letter "K". Neither the prescribed light pattern nor identification signal was identified by the aircrew in spite of three (3) separate approaches and passes over the designated LZ. They did, however, see three (3) lights, described as much larger and brighter than a three cell flashlight, on the LZ. The lights appeared to be stationary, vertical, and in approximately the expected positions of the No. 2, 3 and 4 lights in the "L" pattern, with the distance between No. 3 and 4 estimated as 100-150 yards rather than the anticipated 50 yards. They were observed on the first two (2) approaches and passes over the LZ and possibly on the third. At no time was a fourth light, an identification signal, or even a blinking light observed by the aircrew.

9. a. KKEK - BCKK at 2037Z
b. KTAC - LBLK at 2320Z
c. KSAE - LLLB (LZ) at 0011Z, 0017Z and 0031Z

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- d. KTEL - LBLC at 0111Z
e. KKEK - BCCK at 0419Z

10.

<u>ROUTE</u>		<u>ALTITUDE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>CLOUDS</u>	<u>VISIBILITY</u>
a. <u>APPROVED</u>	b. <u>ACTUAL</u>	(<u>ABSOLUTE</u>)	(<u>ZULU</u>)		
KKEK - BCCK	KKEK - BCCK (TO)	---	2037	LO-LCST	3-F
KSNB - BRKK	KSEB - BSLE (TP)	500	2127	HI	10
KSET - BSLK	KSLK - BTAE (CP)	500	2150	IFR	IFR
KSKN - BOLK	KTLL - BNBL (TP)	300	2238	CLR	20
KTLA - BOKB	KTEC - LBLK (TP/CIP)	050	2320	CLR	20
KSKO - LBLB					
KSKO - LBKO	KSKO - LBKN (TP)	200	2352	CLR	20
KSCB - LLEB	KSCB - LLEB (TP)	1,000	0002	CLR	20
KSAA - LLBA	KSAA - LLBC (TP/IP)	1,000	0008	CLR	20
KSAB - LLLB	KSAB - LLLB (LZ)	1,000	0011	CLR	20
	KSAA - LLBC (TP/IP)	1,000	0014	CLR	20
	KSAB - LLLB (LZ)	1,000	0017	CLR	20
	KSAS - LLAC (TP/IP)	1,000	0023	CLR	20
	KSAB - LLLB (LZ)	1,000	0031	CLR	20
KSCB - LLAC	KSCB - LLAC (TP)	300	0043	CLR	20
KSKO - LBLB	KTEL - LBLC (TP/COP)	200	0111	CLR	20
KTBA - LELC	KTBR - LEET (TP)	200	0138	LO-OCST	3-F
KSLC - BSLS	KSLK - BTAE (CP)	500	0210	IFR	IFR
	KKBN - BKBA (CP)	500	0407	LO-BKN	5-F
KKEK - BCCK	KKEK - BCCK (LAND)	---	0419	--	--

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- Note:
- Base weather at departure was clear and 1 mile in fog.
 - Columns headed altitude, clouds, and visibility refer to conditions between position on same line and position on following line.
 - Frontal activity, including thunderstorms, was encountered outbound between KSLK-BTAE and KTLL-BNBL, resulting in IFR.
 - The southern tip of OLAND Island was crossed, and the south-eastern corner of the SWEDISH mainland was possibly crossed, while circumnavigating thunderstorms and flying IFR inbound between KSLK-BTAE and KKBN-BKBA.
 - Five (5) minute area search for light pattern and identification was begun at 0031Z.

- 11.
- See paragraph 8a above.
 - Level, but generally swampy with exception of LZ.
 - Clear and twenty (20) miles, with wind unknown but apparently light on the surface.
 - None.
 - A total of twenty (20) minutes on three (3) separate passes spent in LZ area (i.e., within four (4) miles of LZ).
 - Ninety (90) MPH IAS while in LZ area. Altitude 1000' absolute.

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- g. Landing was not made.
- h. Aircrew reported:

- (1) Excellent weather in LZ area.
- (2) LZ appeared exactly as they were briefed.
- (3) LZ appeared to be level, dry, free of trees and bushes, and to have satisfactory approaches.

12. None

13. a. LZ was located by a combination of:

- (1) Pilotage - based on detailed briefing and study of agents sketch and maps with a scale of 1:500,000; 1:75,000; and 1:25,000.
- (2) Dead reckoning - based on time and heading from known and positively identified Target Approach Points (TAPs) i.e., lakes at KSAA-LLBC and KBAS-LLAC.

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b. LZ was positively identified by a combination of (1) and (2) above and the following specific details: ~~RYBA~~

- (1) Location, shape and estimated height of wooded areas.
- (2) Location of three (3) houses east of LZ.

14. None

15. a. Five (5) searchlights along coast between KSKS and KTBT were turned on when the aircraft was inbound approximately twenty (20) miles out and at 300 feet altitude. They were still on when the coast was crossed outbound.

b. Contrary to expectations, the aircrew noted:

- (1) Considerable vehicular activity in the general vicinity of the LZ and enroute out.
- (2) Most towns along route were well lit.

- c. Three (3) vehicles, with lights on, at approximately KSCS-LLBS appeared to be searching open fields.
- d. Two (2) vehicles, with lights on, at approximately KSET-LBCT appeared to be searching open fields.
- e. Tower similar to a radio transmitter, and approximately 300 feet high, with red obstructions lights, at approximately KSKK-LLEL.
- f. Well lit factory with three tiered, sawtooth roof at approximately KSCS-LLAE.
- g. Open excavation, similar to gravel pit, just northwest of LZ and on same field.

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16. a. The Frankfurt Air Branch has completed extensive and detailed interrogations (supplemented by LOFLUTTERS, as reported in detail in EGQA-68512, EGQA-68513 and EGQA-68576) of , and now holds the firm opinion that:

- (1) The aircraft was flown within 200 yards of the designated LZ on each of the three (3) separate approaches.
- (2) The aircraft was within four (4) miles of the designated LZ for a total of approximately twenty (20) minutes.
- (3) The aircraft was at an absolute altitude of approximately 1,000 feet for the entire period it was in the near vicinity of the designated LZ.
- (4) As directed in briefing, the red and green navigation lights (white tail light was removed) were periodically turned on and off while the aircraft was in the near vicinity of the LZ.
- (5) The aircraft was not landed because:
 - (a) The fourth light in the prescribed "L" pattern was never sighted on the LZ by the aircrew.
 - (b) At no time was the recognition signal, or any blinking light, visible to the aircrew. (Crew was instructed not to land unless correct light pattern and recognition signal were observed.)
 - (c) The three (3) lights seen on the LZ by the aircrew were determined by them to be much larger and brighter than three cell flashlights.

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- b. In view of 16a, above, and the unusually hazardous nature of the flight actually performed in a single-engined aircraft, TPCONSULS 19 and 23 have been paid \$1,500 apiece, as authorized by DIR 39629.
- c. In view of the apparent discrepancies between paragraph 16a, above, and post-mission WT reports from CAMBARO 2 (Frederick of SR Division has details), the Frankfurt Air Branch feels that the following points must be resolved prior to re-scheduling mission:

- (1) What type of lights did the Reception Committee show?
- (2) Were the lights fixed, or hand held? Did they follow the aircraft?
- (3) Was there, in fact, a fourth light displayed? If so, was it of the same type and intensity as the other three?
- (4) Was the recognition signal ("K") actually given with a blinking light? If so, was the light of the same type and intensity as the others? What color?
- (5) Was the aircraft, or its navigation light(s), actually seen by the Reception Committee? If so, at what time(s) and for what period(s)?
- (6) At what time(s) and for what period(s) was the aircraft actually heard by the Reception Committee?

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- (7) Does a thorough review and analysis of all communication from CAMBARO 2 and CANUSO 2, particularly any post-mission traffic, conclusively indicate the absence of any possibility of control of either of the two (2) agents?
- d. Since the requirement still exists for the soonest possible exfiltration of CAMBARO 2 and CANUSO 2, your attention is invited to the approaching winter, with generally unfavorable surface and flying conditions, and the resultant requirement for the expeditious resolution of the questions contained in paragraph 166 above.
- e. For your consideration:
- (1) The Frankfurt Air Branch feels that:
- (a) This type mission is feasible.
 - (b) ☐ are capable of executing such a mission.
 - (c) Crew should be paid a special cash bonus, according to the degree of hazard involved.
- (2) ☐ have:
- (a) Expressed definite displeasure at not being able to land and exfiltrate the two (2) agents.
 - (b) Indicated a desire to attempt the exfiltration again (presumably on the same financial basis).

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APPROVED: ☐

RELEASED BY: ☐

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